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  The People’s Republic of China’s revised rules governing foreign 
acquisitions of domestic enterprises, promulgated in the fall of 2006, 
disappointed many observers who had hoped for a more open and 
transparent approach to Chinese foreign investment. On closer 
inspection, however, the United States’ own laws and policies 
restricting foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises influenced the 
Chinese rules’ protectionism. The costs of U.S. trade policy have 
extended beyond Chinese law. Both the U.S. and Chinese rules 
limiting foreign investment likely violate each country’s respective 
GATS commitments. These violations bring consequences beyond the 
borders of these two nations, undermining free trade in the global 
economy. 
INTRODUCTION 
  “If American companies are allowed to buy out any Chinese 
company they like, but Chinese companies are prevented from 
doing the same in the U.S., that’s not fair.”1 
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In August of 2006, the People’s Republic of China (China) 
promulgated its long-awaited revised regulations governing foreign 
acquisitions2 of Chinese companies, the Provisions on Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Chinese M&A Rules).3 
Despite hopes that the revised rules would provide clearer guidance 
than earlier acquisition regulations,4 the revised rules continue to lack 
precision. More controversially, the revised rules continue to give the 
Ministry of Commerce broad power to review and refuse acquisitions 
of China’s domestic companies by foreign entities on a case-by-case 
basis with few concrete judging criteria.5 The crux of the controversy 
is the vaguely worded Article Twelve, which allows the Ministry of 
Commerce to refuse and even undo acquisitions if they affect 
“economic security.”6 
 
 1. Eugene Tang & Matthew Benjamin, China’s Foreign-Takeover Rules May Hurt 
Growth, Invite Backlash, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601109&sid=aqATQkgcuqBM&refer=exclusive (quoting the Sany Heavy Industry 
Company’s executive vice president). 
 2. The Chinese M&A Rules apply equally to mergers and acquisitions. Provisions on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006) 
(P.R.C.), art. 2, available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/ 
200610/20061003434565.html (English translation by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China). For simplicity, this Note uses the term “acquisitions” throughout. 
 3. Id. The Ministry of Commerce promulgated the regulations, and they became effective 
on September 8, 2006. Id. 
 4. Prior to the revised Chinese M&A Rules, China regulated foreign acquisitions of 
domestic companies with interim regulations. Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye zhixing 
guiding [Interim Regulations on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 7, 2003, effective Apr. 12, 2003) 
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/17/content_569271.htm 
(English translation). Commentators have criticized these earlier rules. See, e.g., Peter A. 
Neumann & Tony Zhang, China’s New Foreign-Funded M&A Provisions: Greater Legal 
Protection or Legalized Protectionism?, 20 CHINA LAW & PRAC. 21, 21 (2006) (noting that the 
Interim Regulations “were issued somewhat hastily”). 
 5. See INV. DIV., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN CHINA’S POLICIES TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (M&A) 3 
(2006) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (“The lack of definition of terms . . . appears to render the 
new screening requirement less than wholly transparent.”); see also Provisions on Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 10 (vesting 
examination and approval authority in the Ministry of Commerce).  
 6. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, art. 12 (stating that the Ministry of Commerce has the power to review 
mergers and to stop those mergers not submitted to it for review). 
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The United States is one of China’s biggest trading partners,7 and 
American investors and others reacted strongly to the Chinese M&A 
Rules.8 Many observers both in the United States and abroad saw the 
revised rules as a step back in China’s progressive economic 
liberalization.9 The United States, however, may have actually 
contributed to the content of the new rules. Although the U.S. 
Congress did not pen the words of Article 12, U.S. policies resisting 
acquisitions of domestic American companies by foreign entities had 
a discernible impact on the content of the revised rules. After the 
United States prevented a Chinese company from acquiring a 
California corporation, China responded with revised rules that 
heightened Chinese protectionism.10 
Both the Chinese and U.S. acquisition rules may also run afoul of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. The United States 
has argued that its own acquisition11 rules are no more restrictive than 
necessary to maintain national security.12 Even if this argument is 
accepted, the perceived hypocrisy of the United States blocking 
politically unpopular acquisitions of U.S. entities by Chinese 
companies while simultaneously urging more openness in the global 
market undermines American influence and credibility. The costs of 
 
 7. In 2007, the United States had a trade deficit with China of over 256 billion U.S. 
dollars. U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ 
balance/c5700.html# (last visited Apr. 31, 2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Client Alert, Baker & McKenzie, China Amends Foreign M&A Regulations 1 
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/CDDDA47C-B52E-40AC-
9325-95DB28803733/40679/ChinaAlertMASep061.pdf (“[T]hese new provisions have sparked 
concerns among foreign investors that future acquisitions will be subject to much tighter control 
and further scrutiny by the Chinese government.”). 
 9. See OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that the revised rules amount to an “ex 
post restriction which can substantially impede the stability of cross-border merger or 
acquisition transactions”). 
 10. See infra Part I.B. 
 11. This Note also uses “acquisition” to mean both mergers and acquisitions under U.S. 
M&A Rules, because like the Chinese rules, see supra note 2, the U.S. rules apply to mergers 
and acquisitions equally, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000) (“The President or the President’s 
designee may make an investigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of this 
section.”). 
 12. See Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (CFIUS), U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Section 
721 of the Defense of Production Act of 1950, http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-
affairs/exon-florio/ (last visited Apr. 31, 2008) (“The intent of Exon-Florio is not to discourage 
[foreign direct investment] generally, but to provide a mechanism to review and, if the President 
finds necessary, to restrict [foreign direct investment] that threatens the national security.”). 
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this perceived hypocrisy are not always clearly defined or restricted to 
national borders. 
Part I of this Note examines the relationship between the U.S. 
and Chinese policies regarding acquisitions of domestic enterprises by 
foreign investors. It describes how U.S. policies have triggered 
heightened protectionism in China. Part II analyzes the legality of 
U.S. and Chinese acquisition rules in light of both countries’ 
commitments to the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). It concludes that both countries have violated their 
obligations under the GATS, and it argues that these violations carry 
potential costs to the United States, China, and the world economy. 
Given U.S. commitments to free trade in services through the GATS, 
the United States must consider the impact of the perception of its 
own seemingly anti–free trade policies on the rest of the world, both 
in terms of developing the policies of their trading partners and in 
terms of the economic costs of violating treaty obligations. 
I.  THE U.S. AND CHINESE RULES 
This Part compares U.S. and Chinese policies governing 
acquisitions by foreign investors of domestic companies. Section A 
introduces the U.S. rules on acquisitions of domestic companies by 
foreign investors (U.S. M&A Rules). Section B focuses on the 
application and expansion of those rules in the context of a failed bid 
to buy the U.S. oil company Unocal by the Chinese domestic oil 
company CNOOC. Section C explores the Chinese reaction to the 
failed bid and the subsequent promulgation of the Chinese M&A 
Rules. Section D compares the two systems and their respective 
motivations. 
A. The U.S. Rules 
In 1975, in the midst of the cold war, President Ford issued an 
executive order that created the Committee on Foreign Investments 
in the United States (CFIUS)13 to review acquisitions of domestic 
companies by foreign entities “determined to threaten the national 
 
 13. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) app. at 167–
168 (2000). 
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security of the United States.”14 This concern about national security 
has dominated acquisition restriction discourse since the creation of 
CFIUS.15 In 1988, for example, Congress passed the Exon-Florio 
Amendment16 in response to growing fears of increased foreign 
ownership of domestic corporations.17 That amendment “empowered 
the president to block mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies by 
foreign firms when such takeovers threatened national security and 
where that threat could not be addressed effectively through other 
laws and regulations.”18 
CFIUS does not review every foreign acquisition. It looks only at 
foreign acquisitions that the parties voluntarily submit for review,19 
that the president determines could affect national security,20 or when 
the president makes a special request.21 When CFIUS does review an 
acquisition, it issues an opinion about whether a credible threat to 
 
 14. CFIUS, supra note 12. The members of CFIUS are 
the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic 
Policy, Secretaries of Treasury (Chair), State, Defense, Homeland Security and 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. 
Org. for Int’l Inv., Fact Sheet, http://www.ofii.org/factsheet.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2008). 
 15. ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT No. 18, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: 
GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 4 (2006). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 
(2002)). 
 17. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (delegating broad power to the president to review 
covered transactions, which include those that “could result in foreign control of persons 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States”); id. § 2170(f)(3) (listing “the control of 
domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens” as a factor the President or 
President’s designee may take into account); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981), 
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171 app. at 480–82 (2000) (delegating responsibility under 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2170 for trade negotiations, including those “concerning direct investment incentives and 
disincentives and bilateral investment issues concerning barriers to investment,” to the United 
States Trade Representative). 
 18. LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 4. Not every transaction with a foreign 
corporation requires CFIUS approval. Id. at 6. For example, “[i]n the last few years, CFIUS has 
reviewed between forty and sixty-five transactions out of the more than 1,000 foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. enterprises made annually.” Id. 
 19. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (“[T]he President’s designee may make an 
investigation . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 20. Id. § 2170(b). 
 21. Id. § 2170(d). 
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national security exists.22 Parties generally opt to file their acquisitions 
with CFIUS because if they do not, the president or CFIUS can undo 
the acquisition at any time, even years after the completion of the 
deal.23 Filing with CFIUS is supposed to provide assurance that a deal 
will not be rejected later.24 That assurance, however, is not absolute. 
In the last two years, Congress has blocked at least two major deals 
that CFIUS initially approved.25 It is reported that “53 percent of 
Americans believe foreign ownership of U.S. companies is ‘bad for 
 
 22. Id. § 2170(b)(3)(B). The Organization for International Development has summarized 
the process of the CFIUS review since the Exon-Florio Amendment: 
  Filing a notice with CFIUS of a foreign acquisition is voluntary and typically done 
at the initiative of the parties. However, parties are motivated to file by the fact that 
the law empowers CFIUS and the President to dissolve the acquisition at any time in 
the future, even after an acquisition has been completed, if a filing was not made. 
  After a transaction has been filed, CFIUS conducts an initial review, utilizing the 
full intelligence and national security infrastructure of the U.S. government, based on 
detailed information from the parties, which frequently receive questions and 
requests for clarification from CFIUS. The scope of these reviews focus on two key 
thresholds: 
  Test 1: Is there credible evidence that the foreign interest exercising control might 
take action that threatens national security? 
  Test 2: If yes, do laws other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President 
to protect national security? 
  If consensus exists that no credible threat to national security exists, or threat has 
been mitigated, CFIUS decides—within 30 days—not to open a further investigation. 
  If threats exist, or agencies are divided, CFIUS conducts an investigation for an 
additional 45 days, after which CFIUS is required to file a report with the President. 
The President will have 15 days to make a decision whether or not to block a 
transaction. 
Org. for Int’l Inv., supra note 14. 
 23. Org. for Int’l Inv., supra note 14. 
 24. Cf. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL 
SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 4 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/RS22197.pdf (“Despite the voluntary nature of the notification, firms largely notify 
voluntarily because the regulations stipulate that foreign acquisitions that are governed by the 
Exon-Florio review process that do not notify the Committee remain subject indefinitely to 
divestment or other appropriate actions by the President.”). 
 25. House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deals, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www. 
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187147,00.html (discussing the congressional decision to block the 
takeover of several U.S. ports by UAE company Dubai Ports World); US Lawmakers Meddle in 
CNOOC’s Unocal Bid, CHINA DAILY, July 6, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/ 
2005-07/06/content_457677.htm (discussing congressional interference in the proposed Unocal 
merger). Some commentators have speculated that the block of the CNOOC bid was in part 
because of “[a]nti-China sentiment in Congress” which had been “building for several years, 
stemming from security concerns, complaints of currency manipulation and intellectual property 
theft, and other unfair trade practices.” Ben White & Justin Blum, Chinese Consider Assurances 
to Unocal, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005, at D3. 
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America.’”26 Not surprisingly, in both cases in which Congress 
intervened to block an acquisition of a U.S. enterprise by a foreign 
corporation, there was a great deal of popular support for the 
congressional action.27 
In part to prevent such ad hoc interventions, on July 27, 2007, 
President George W. Bush expanded the power of the CFIUS system 
by signing into law the Foreign Investment and National Security 
Act.28 This legislation broadens the range of deals that are subject to 
CFIUS review and mandates a “45-day probe for most cross-border 
deals.”29 Some observers have hailed this legislation for strengthening 
CFIUS by “provid[ing] greater security during this perilous time,”30 
but others have expressed concern that the changes, especially the 
length of the mandatory investigation period, will place foreign 
investors and potential acquirers at a disadvantage relative to their 
American competitors.31 
B. CNOOC and Unocal 
Prior to the signing of the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act into law, the U.S. Congress intervened to prevent 
Chinese oil giant China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) 
from acquiring the California-based energy company Unocal.32 This 
intervention was widely accepted as necessary and important in the 
United States33 but was strongly criticized in China.34 In 2005, 
 
 26. LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 3. 
 27. Emad Mekay, China Oil Bid Tests US Free Market Rhetoric, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 
15, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GG15Ad01.html (citing a poll stating that 73 
percent of those polled disapproved of the prospective merger at the time). 
 28. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 
246 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000)); Press Release, The White House, President Bush 
Signs Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (July 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070726-6.html. 
 29. Alan Rappeport, Bill Would Broaden Scrutiny of Foreign Investments, CFO.COM, July 
13, 2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9494378/c_9494881 (citing Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007, H.R. 556-4, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005). The resolution “express[ed] the sense of the House 
of Representatives that a Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of critical 
United States energy infrastructure and energy production capacity could take action that 
would threaten to impair the national security of the United States.” Id. 
 33. See supra note 27. 
 34. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, China Tells Congress to Back off Businesses, WASH. POST 
FOREIGN SERVICE, July 5, 2005, at A1. 
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CNOOC commenced “Operation Treasure Ship” and entered its bid 
for Unocal at $67 per share.35 CNOOC rival Chevron was also 
interested in Unocal and offered Unocal $60 per share.36 As the deal 
between Unocal and CNOOC progressed, it was met by increased 
political opposition.37 Members of the U.S. Congress went on record 
stating that “Cnooc’s proposal should be rejected on security 
grounds.”38 They reasoned that “China’s purchase of Unocal would 
dramatically increase its leverage over [critical players and key U.S. 
allies in the global war on terror] and therefore its leverage over U.S. 
interests in those regions.”39 On June 30, 2005, the House of 
Representatives voted 398 to 15 in favor of a nonbinding resolution 
that condemned the takeover as a threat to national security.40 On 
August 1 of the same year, Unocal’s board of directors recommended 
that shareholders take the Chevron offer because the CNOOC bid 
price did not sufficiently “compensate Unocal shareholders for the 
‘higher risk of the CNOOC transaction.’”41 On August 2, CNOOC 
announced the withdrawal of its takeover offer for Unocal. The SEC 
subsequently approved Chevron’s acquisition of Unocal. 
The failed deal provoked outrage among China’s economic and 
political elite.42 China responded on behalf of its embattled company 
by accusing the U.S. government of “politicizing economic and trade 
issues” and “interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between 
enterprises of the two countries.”43 The cost to Unocal shareholders 
of the accepted lower Chevron offer was more than 1.5 billion 
dollars.44 The loss caused by the intervention, however, may not have 
 
 35. Bill Powell, The Energy Game, TIME ASIA, May 23, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/ 
asia/2005/china_resource/china_oil.html.  
 36. US Lawmakers Meddle in CNOOC’s Unocal Bid, supra note 25. 
 37. See White & Blum, supra note 25 (discussing how “[o]pposition to the Chinese firm’s 
bid intensified in Washington” as CNOOC considered adding additional assurances to its 
unsolicited takeover bid). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 41. CNOOC Withdrawal Clears Way for Chevron Merger, EAST BAY BUS. TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2005/08/01/daily11.html. 
 42. See, e.g., US Lawmakers Meddle in CNOOC’s Unocal Bid, supra note 25 (“China 
angrily responded to a vote by US lawmakers last week that urged the US administration to 
block CNOOC’s 18.5-billion-dollar takeover bid for Unocal.”). 
 43. Id. (quoting a Chinese foreign ministry statement). 
 44. CNOOC Withdrawal Clears Way for Chevron Merger, supra note 41. 
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been limited to this specific transaction.45 China appears to have 
learned much from Congress’s reactions to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal. 
The revised Chinese M&A Rules, promulgated almost exactly one 
year after the withdrawal of CNOOC’s offer, contain similarly 
protectionist language.46 Although some may believe that intervening 
to halt the purchase of Unocal was necessary to maintain national 
security through domestic ownership of vital oil supplies, few 
probably considered that U.S. actions would prompt changes in 
Chinese legislation. 
C. The Chinese Rules 
In theory, the revised Chinese M&A Rules are intended to focus 
Chinese investments on quality rather than quantity.47 But the rules’ 
vague provisions giving the Ministry of Commerce sweeping authority 
to restrict foreign acquisitions48 disappointed many observers who had 
hoped that the revised rules would signal a change in China’s opaque 
practices of acquisition approval.49 
The history of acquisitions in China is relatively brief. Before 
1983, Chinese law prohibited foreign investors from acquiring a stake 
 
 45. See Mekay, supra note 27 (“[A] move by Congress to block the deal outright would 
send a message that US rhetoric about open investment rules ‘is a one-way street.’”). Even 
before the merger attempt fell apart, commentators suggested that this was a test for the U.S. 
free-trade rhetoric in Asia. Id. 
 46. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“On 8 August 2006 the Ministry of Commerce . . . 
posted . . . a new set of Regulations on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors . . . .”); CNOOC Withdrawal Clears Way for Chevron Merger, supra note 41 (noting 
the withdraw of the Unocal bid in August of 2005); see also E-mail from Jonathan Ocko, 
Professor and Head, North Carolina State University Department of History, to author (May 1, 
2008, 23:05:49 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[I]n the fall of 2006, I had a 
conversation with a senior official in the National Development and Reform Commission who 
wouldn’t come right out and say that China had copied US statutes . . . . Instead he observed 
that American lawyers were always lecturing China on the need to learn from US legislation, 
and that China had simply followed this advice . . . .”). 
 47. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“The new policy towards cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions is explained in the 11th five-year plan for utilising foreign investment, published by 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on 9 November 2006. This states 
that priority will be given to quality rather than quality of foreign investments . . . .”).  
 48. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 49. See generally OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 1–2 (reviewing Chinese foreign 
investment policy in an effort to “contribut[e] to the OECD’s co-operation with China to 
develop more open, transparent and non-discriminatory investment policies in support of 
China’s development”). 
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in Chinese companies.50 From 1983 to 2003, the central government 
dealt with acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign entities on 
an ad hoc basis.51 In April of 2003, the Chinese government 
promulgated the Interim Regulations on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Interim Regulations).52 
The Interim Regulations outlined a process for foreign corporations 
to acquire controlling stakes in domestic Chinese enterprises,53 but the 
regulations’ vague language provided little certainty for investors. 
The Interim Regulations were merely a starting place; China planned 
to enact more detailed regulations.54 
Since 1994, the Chinese government, motivated by a desire for 
international capital and an exponentially growing economy, has 
welcomed foreign investors with progressively open arms and given 
them more and more access to lucrative shares of Chinese 
companies.55 In 2005, however, the Chinese business community grew 
increasingly concerned that foreign enterprises were being given too 
many advantages in the emerging market and were thus gaining 
“capacity and market share in China, without adequate oversight by 
the central government.”56 The very public battle between the 
Chinese Sany Corporation (Sany) and American Carlyle Group 
(Carlyle Group) magnified this sentiment.57 Both companies wished 
to take over China’s largest construction machinery manufacturer, 
Shanghai-based Xugong Construction Machinery Group (XCMG).58 
The Carlyle Group was the first to enter into an agreement with 
XCMG on the takeover.59 After having its own takeover bid 
 
 50. ORG. FOR ECON., CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CHINA’S FDI POLICIES 8 (2003), 
available at http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/china_fdi_update.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye zhixing guiding [Interim Regulations on Mergers 
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors], supra note 4; Neumann & 
Zhang, supra note 4, at 21. 
 53. Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye zhixing guiding [Interim Regulations on Mergers 
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors], supra note 4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Neumann & Zhang, supra note 4, at 21 (“[O]ver 250 Chinese enterprises worth 
more than US$14 billion have been acquired by foreign purchasers.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Russell Flannery, A China That Can Say No, FORBES.COM, Sept. 18, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/business/global/2006/0918/096.html (describing the controversy). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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dismissed, however, Sany launched a popular opinion protest against 
the proposed Carlyle Group acquisition.60 
The president of Sany launched the media attack on his personal 
internet blog,61 criticizing the government for allowing foreign 
ownership of a vital part of the Chinese construction market.62 In the 
face of growing public discontent, the Ministry of Commerce 
suspended review of the acquisition, placing it in bureaucratic limbo 
for over a year until the Carlyle Group decided to scale back its initial 
investment from 85 percent to 50 percent.63 The Carlyle Group 
changed its majority ownership position to secure central government 
approval of the deal, something that had become less and less likely 
as time dragged on.64 
The same year the Carlyle Group’s takeover was thwarted, the 
Ministry of Commerce promulgated and adopted the revised Chinese 
M&A Rules.65 Although the revised rules consist of sixty-one 
provisions, as opposed to the twenty-six provisions in the interim 
rules, the additions to the revised rules primarily extend and clarify 
versions of the vague interim rules.66 There are some pronounced 
 
 60. See id. (“Sany aims to block the purchase of its bigger government-owned domestic 
rival, Xugong Group Construction Machinery, by America’s well-connected Carlyle Group.”). 
See generally Xiang Wenbo de Boke [Blog of Xiang Wenbo], http://xiangwenbo.blog. 
sohu.com/entry/#entry (July 7, 2006, 22:03; July 11, 2006, 19:07) (explaining Xiang Wenbo’s 
distrust for the American takeover and opposition to it). 
 61. See Xiang Wenbo de Boke [Blog of Xiang Wenbo], supra note 60 (June 8, 2006, 17:40–
Sept. 22, 2006, 22:37). 
 62. War of Words in Company Takeover Battle, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, June 16, 2006, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/16/eng20060616_274537.html. 
 63. Largest Machine Tool Manufacturer to Sell Shares, XINHUA, Nov. 29, 2006, http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/29/content_5406343.htm. 
 64. See id. (discussing the sale of 49 percent of China’s largest machine tool manufacturer). 
Sany was still not satisfied; the president of the company called the deal “illegal” and alleged 
that the Carlyle Group had manipulated the system to result in a higher share of control than 
what the central government had agreed upon. Xiang Wenbo de Boke [Blog of Xiang Wenbo], 
supra note 60 (Aug. 5, 2006, 11:12). 
 65. See OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“On 8 August 2006 the Ministry of 
Commerce . . . posted . . . a new set of Regulations on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors . . . .”); Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 61 (“These Regulations shall come into force as of 
September 8, 2006.”). 
 66. Compare Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2 (promulgating more detailed rules for the regulation of foreign 
investment), with Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye zhixing guiding [Interim Regulations on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors], supra note 4 
(presenting a basic outline for the regulation of foreign investment). 
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differences, however.67 Some of the revised rules are likely to smooth 
the way for foreign investors who would otherwise be unable to 
acquire ownership in Chinese companies.68 Other articles, however, 
have caused a great deal of concern among foreign investors. 
One of the most controversial of the Chinese M&A Rules, and 
the focus of this Note, is Article Twelve. Article Twelve requires all 
acquisitions involving any “key industry,” “famous trademarks,”69 or 
“traditional Chinese brands,” or which impact or may impact 
“national economic security,” to be submitted to the Ministry of 
Commerce for approval.70 If it is determined that the acquisition 
causes or may cause a “significant impact” on “state economy 
security,” the Ministry of Commerce can stop the acquisition or force 
the return of assets.71 
The lack of a clear definition for terms like “impact” on 
“national economic security” makes the process less than 
transparent72 and gives wide discretion to officials charged with 
approving foreign acquisitions.73 Such broad discretion may make 
investing in China more difficult for foreign firms.74 In addition, 
 
 67. Several authors have speculated on the most important aspects of the changes. See, e.g., 
Fei Ya, CSRC Releases New M&A Rule, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/bizchina/2006-08/03/content_656053.htm (“The new rule . . . is expected to give more 
options to acquirers, reduce takeover costs and increase takeover efficiency.”); Client Alert, 
supra note 8, at 1 (“The key changes introduced by the Acquisition Regulations relate to the 
reporting procedures to, and approval by, MOFCOM.”). 
 68. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, arts. 27–29 (providing for acquisitions by foreign investors of domestic 
enterprises through the “payment of equity interests” in certain circumstances). Before these 
rules, this method of payment was not allowed. See Waiguo touzi zhibing goujing nei qiye 
zhixing guiding [Interim Regulations on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors], supra note 4 (not providing for the use of equity interests as a form of 
payment in an acquisition). 
 69. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (“‘Famous trademarks’ can be certified by a 
People’s Court and also by Chinese administrative agencies, including the Trademark Office of 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Since People’s Court certifications are 
not listed publicly, it is difficult for foreign investors to see whether a trademark falls into the 
category of ‘famous trademarks.’ It is not usual for developed countries to restrict cross-border 
mergers or acquisition by reason of ‘famous’ trademark or ‘traditional’ brands.”).  
 70. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 71. Id. 
 72. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
 73. See id. (“Chinese government agencies charged with implementing the new regulations 
may not have enough information to be able to apply these terms to an actual transaction.”). 
 74. Id. 
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Article Twelve’s general language implicates nearly every Chinese 
domestic company. Officials could consider that even a small and 
rather localized corporation might impact economic security in some 
minor way.75 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) expressed grave concerns over the “distinction [created by 
the rules] . . . between domestic enterprises and foreign investors.”76 
The OECD had hoped, and China had even reassured it, that the 
discriminatory acquisition notification procedures would be replaced 
 
 75. It is also important to recognize that the Chinese system is still in transition between a 
fully state owned and operated economy and a private market economy. See Corinna-Barbara 
Francis, Quasi-Public, Quasi-Private Trends in Emerging Market Economies: The Case of China, 
33 COMP. POL. 275, 275 (2001) (describing the “interdependence and mutual constitution of 
state and market” in modern capitalist states). The distinctive nature of the Chinese economy 
often makes it difficult to differentiate between what is private and what is government. See id. 
(“While market transitions have contributed to the emergence of new, relatively autonomous 
market and social forces, they intersect with the state in complex ways. . . . These features make 
it difficult clearly to draw the boundaries of the state and to say where the state ends and 
‘society’ and ‘the market’ begin.”). This impacts the way that the government analyzes domestic 
takeovers in part because when government assets are to be sold to private entities, other 
governmental bureaus must be involved. See Robert Lewis, Chinese SOEs: Playing the State 
Asset Game, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2008, at 11, 11–12, available at http://www.iflr.com/ 
?Page=17&ISS=24509&SID=700971 (discussing the role of the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission in the sale of State Owned Enterprises). Thus, Article Twelve 
truly could extend to small, localized, partially government owned corporations. 
 76. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 4. The OECD wondered whether the new procedures 
would differentiate between domestic organizations and foreign investors with respect to 
monopoly law: 
  The OECD’s 2006 Review also noted that “the 2003 Interim Provisions contain 
regulations on pre-merger notification that appear to discriminate against foreign 
investors and others that are based on unquantifiable pre-merger notification 
thresholds.” The Review welcomed the Chinese government’s intention to 
promulgate a non-discriminatory anti-monopoly law and meanwhile recommended 
changes to the merger notification procedures in the 2003 Interim Provisions to 
increase their transparency. It was understood informally from the Chinese 
authorities that they intended to replace the discriminatory merger notification 
procedures in the 2003 Interim Provisions with a merger notification procedure in the 
anti-monopoly law that did not distinguish between domestic enterprises and foreign 
investors. This reassurance was needed in view of recent calls from some officials for 
the new anti-monopoly law to block undesirable cross-border acquisitions, following 
a report by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in 2004 that 
foreign companies were building monopolies in China (an allegation that MOFCOM 
has since publicly refuted). The merger notification procedures in the 2006 
Regulations do not reflect the OECD’s recommendations and are essentially the same 
as those in the 2003 Interim Provisions. It remains to be seen whether these 
procedures will be rescinded when the anti-monopoly law is promulgated and 
whether there will be any distinction in the anti-monopoly law between domestic 
enterprises and foreign investors. 
Id. 
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with an acquisition notification procedure that “did not distinguish 
between domestic enterprises and foreign investors.”77 
Many foreign investors have experienced difficulties when 
“attempting to acquire majority stakes in Chinese companies, even in 
the absence of express legal restrictions on foreign equity 
participation.”78 Further, the vague wording of Article 12 has created 
a sense of “considerable uncertainty surrounding the likely success or 
completion of forthcoming transactions.”79 Corporations fear that the 
heightened scrutiny may result in costly delays.80 
The revised rules have slowed or halted a higher percentage of 
acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign investors.81 In 2006, 
China halted the approval process of 27 percent of proposed 
leveraged buyouts.82 The year before it only had refused to approve 6 
percent.83 Despite an economy that grew over 10 percent in 2006,84 the 
volume of acquisitions of domestic corporations by foreign investors 
as well as the value of those acquisitions only increased by about 1 
percent.85 As a whole the rules disappointed those who had hoped for 
a clearer roadmap to foreign ownership of domestic enterprises in 
China.86 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Client Alert, supra note 8, at 1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 3. For example, Baker & McKenzie, a law firm with wide experience in the 
Chinese market, explained concerns about the new rules in a recent client alert: 
In light of recent reports that a number of foreign investors have run into difficulties 
when attempting to acquire majority stakes in Chinese companies, even in the 
absence of express legal restrictions on foreign equity participation, these new 
provisions have sparked concerns among foreign investors that future acquisitions 
will be subject to much tighter control and further scrutiny by the Chinese 
government. Coupled with the lack of clarity on terms such as “key industry” and 
“national economic security,” there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the likely 
success or completion of forthcoming transactions. Furthermore, the need for 
obtaining government approval at the central level may also cause delay to deals.  
Id. 
 81. Tang & Benjamin, supra note 1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. NBS: China’s GDP Grows 10.7% in 2006, GOV.CN, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.gov.cn/ 
english/2007-01/25/content_507608.htm. 
 85. Tang Fuchun, China’s Top 10 Mergers and Acquisitions Revealed, CHINA.ORG.CN, Jan. 
11, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/195761.htm. 
 86. See id. (describing insufficient financing levels for mergers). The Chinese management 
of the targeted corporation may also be negatively affected because if the foreign investor's 
equity stake is reduced, then there is less equity available for Chinese management of the 
targeted corporation. See David Patrick Eich & Chuan Li, Private Equity Investments In China: 
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The popular sentiment against the Carlyle Group takeover and 
the political reaction in the form of the revised rules was at least in 
part fanned by the United States’ block of the Unocal-CNOOC 
acquisition,87 which some perceived as hypocritical. In the words of 
Xiang Wenbo, Sany Corporation’s president, “[i]f the U.S., Europe, 
Korea and Japan are doing it, then China should do the same,” and 
“[i]f American companies are allowed to buy out any Chinese 
company they like, but Chinese companies are prevented from doing 
the same in the U.S., that’s not fair.”88 
Although Chinese resentment may be justified, and U.S. 
intervention in the Unocal-CNOOC acquisition may have been 
necessary, it is important to step back and look not just at the 
connection between these two actions but also at the separate and 
distinct reasoning behind each system. Part D explores the differences 
between the ways that the two countries deal with proposed 
takeovers of domestic enterprises by foreign entities and the 
reasoning behind their respective systems. 
D. Differences 
The differences between the U.S. and Chinese approaches to the 
approval of foreign takeovers of domestic enterprises begin with the 
differences between the two systems themselves. The United States is 
a well-established rule-of-law jurisdiction, where law is supposed to 
trump all other concerns.89 This may not always be the reality, but it is 
the norm. China, on the other hand, is in the midst of legal reform 
and is still debating whether rule by law or rule of law should be the 
 
Impact of Recent Legal Reforms, VENTURE CAPITAL REV. (Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n and 
Ernst & Young LLP, Arlington, VA), Winter 2007, at 7, 9, available at http://www.kirkland.com/ 
siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2261/Document1/Recent_Legal_Reforms.pdf (“Historically it was 
therefore common for foreign investors acquiring a Chinese company . . . to offer Chinese 
management an opportunity to own equity interests in the offshore holding company 
established to make the acquisition.”). The management is often working with the foreign 
acquiror and using the foreign equity to essentially create a management leveraged buyout of 
the target. Id. 
 87. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 88. Tang & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 3. 
 89. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Rule of Law, http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/democracy/ 
rule_of_law.html (“[I]n the United States, the rule of law is based primarily on the U.S. 
Constitution and on the assurance that U.S. laws—in conjunction with the Constitution—are 
fair and are applied equally to all members of society.”). 
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norm.90 In China, the law is not supreme and does not always provide 
certainty to civil and commercial parties in the face of other 
interests.91 This difference between the two systems is important 
because it affects the ways that the two countries view and implement 
their respective acquisition rules. 
The facial differences between the two M&A regimes are as 
follows. First, the language of Article Twelve of the Chinese M&A 
Rules is much more demanding than that of the U.S. rules.92 Article 
Twelve states that parties “concerned in the acquisition by a foreign 
investor of a domestic enterprise . . . shall apply to [the Ministry of 
Commerce] for examination and approval.”93 In addition, there is no 
guarantee that if submitted and approved, Ministry of Commerce will 
not later undo the acquisition in the name of economic security.94 In 
the United States, parties are not required to submit their acquisitions 
for screening by CFIUS.95 If the parties do not ask for review, the U.S. 
rules allow the government to undo the acquisition, even years later.96 
In practice, therefore, parties may feel as if they are required to 
submit their acquisitions for screening in the United States as well as 
in China. Unlike the Chinese system, however, those firms that do 
submit to CFIUS and are approved are guaranteed a large measure of 
security for their acquisition after it is completed.97 
 
 90. See Testimony on Rule of Law in China: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 109th Cong. 10 (2005) (statement of Minxin Pei, Director of the China Program, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/ 
testimony/2005/PeiTestimony050607.pdf (explaining that although China has made significant 
steps toward modernizing its legal system, it is still in need of additional reforms). 
 91. See id. at 4–9 (describing China’s struggles with a lack of judicial independence, 
insufficient judicial authority, political corruption in the judicial system, and a dearth of and 
respect for the rule of law). 
 92. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12; LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 4. 
 93. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 94. Id. Although the rule does provide that a merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise 
by a foreign entity fitting the criteria listed in Article 12 that is not submitted it will be undone, 
there is no promise that the Ministry of Commerce will not later halt or undo approved 
transactions. Id. 
 95. LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. Congress has, however, intervened in special circumstances, such as CNOOC’s 
proposed takeover of Unocal, even when the CFIUS has approved a merger. White & Blum, 
supra note 25. 
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Second, the Chinese rules do not have a clearly defined process 
for analyzing claims,98 but the U.S. rules do spell out such a process.99 
Although outsiders have complained that the U.S. evaluation process 
is opaque and difficult to understand,100 the process includes clear 
timelines for every part of the process.101 In contrast, the Chinese rules 
involve fluid timelines that are not explained in detail.102 In addition, 
the U.S. rules include an appeals process, a remedy unavailable under 
the Chinese system.103 
The final and core difference is the breadth of the rules. Under 
the U.S. rules CFIUS only screens those transactions that affect 
national security,104 whereas the Chinese rules require the Ministry of 
Commerce to screen acquisitions of famous trademarks, traditional 
Chinese brands, and key industries in addition to acquisitions that 
may affect national economic security.105 Therefore, the U.S. rules 
focus on a narrower interest, national security,106 whereas the Chinese 
 
 98. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, § III (articulating a loose framework for analysis). 
 99. See supra note 76. 
 100. LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 4. 
 101. See supra note 76. 
 102. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, art. 8 (setting out criteria for approval without definite timelines). 
 103. Compare LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 10–13 (describing various 
mechanisms for communication between investors and the U.S. government), with Provisions 
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 12 
(refraining from discussing any appeals process). There may be relief available through external 
sources such as the Administrative Procedure Law or political appeals. See Administrative 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) art. 2, available at http://www.cecc.gov/ 
pages/newLaws/adminLitigationENG.php (English translation). There is not, however, a system 
for appeal specified in the M&A rules. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 8.  
 104. See LARSON & MARCHICK, supra note 15, at 4 (“[The Exon-Florio Amendment] 
empowered the president to block mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign firms 
when such takeovers threatened national security and where that threat could not be addressed 
effectively through other laws and regulations.”). 
 105. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 106. The U.S. rules state at their outset that the rules are not intended to be used to retaliate 
against foreign countries and that the rules are not a departure from the U.S. market’s openness 
to foreign capital. See CFIUS, supra note 12 (“[T]he Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (‘CFIUS’) . . . seeks to serve U.S. investment policy through thorough reviews 
that protect national security while maintaining the credibility of our open investment policy 
and preserving the confidence of foreign investors here and of U.S. investors abroad that they 
will not be subject to retaliatory discrimination.”). This underscores the intended narrowness of 
the U.S. rules. See id. (explaining that the Exon-Florio Amendment was intended to operate in 
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rules focus on an arguably more material interest, economic 
security.107 
II.  THE U.S. AND CHINESE RULES’ VIOLATIONS OF THE GATS AND 
THE COST TO GLOBAL TRADE 
As discussed in Part I, U.S. policies resisting foreign investment 
in domestic enterprises have already provoked China to similarly 
restrict foreign trade.108 The costs of U.S. and Chinese protectionism 
may extend beyond the borders of either nation. Because both the 
United States and China are members of the GATS,109 the U.S. and 
Chinese M&A Rules implicate international law. The rules also affect 
the central policy concern driving the GATS: promoting free trade in 
the global economy. 
Section A evaluates the compatibility of both countries’ foreign 
investment policies with the GATS provisions. Despite the 
differences between the U.S. and Chinese M&A Rules, this Section 
concludes that both countries’ rules violate the GATS. Section B 
explores the costs associated with violating the GATS. It argues that 
the rules harm the credibility of two nations that claim a commitment 
to the principles of free trade and economic development—and the 
WTO’s efforts to encourage free trade in the global economy. 
A. The Compatibility of the U.S. and Chinese M&A Rules with the 
GATS 
The stated purpose of the GATS is to “establish a multilateral 
framework of principles and rules for trade in services . . . as a means 
 
congruence with the United States’ tradition of “welcom[ing] Foreign Direct Investment . . . and 
provid[ing] foreign investors fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory treatment with few limited 
exceptions designed to protect national security”). 
 107. The official understanding of the Chinese M&A Rules is that they are a policy planning 
tool. See Sustainable Investment and Not Speculation, XINHUA, Sept. 18, 2006, http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/18/content_5102935.htm (“The new laws are designed to help 
China maintain market order and balance national economic security and fair competition. The 
amendments ensure the protection of indigenous industries but also continue to encourage the 
investment enthusiasm of foreign companies.”). These comments show how broad the rules are 
really intended to be. 
 108.  See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 109. World Trade Org. (WTO), Understanding the WTO – Members, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2007). 
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of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners . . . .”110 In 
pursuit of these goals, the GATS clearly outlines the commitments of 
each signatory and the exceptions to those commitments, and it 
provides for dispute resolution in case of alleged violations.111 The 
GATS defines “trade in services” as supply of a service through four 
modes of economic activity.112 
WTO members have two categories of obligations under the 
GATS, general obligations and specific obligations.113 General 
obligations apply to all service sectors regardless of whether the 
country has made any specific commitments in those sectors.114 
Specific obligations, on the other hand, apply only to those service 
sectors in which a WTO member has made commitments.115 The 
specific obligations include market access and national treatment.116 
Together market access and national treatment “commit Members to 
giving no less favourable treatment to foreign services and service 
suppliers than provided for in the relevant columns of their 
Schedule.”117 
The GATS includes some exceptions that effectively allow 
members to violate their GATS obligations in limited 
circumstances.118 These exceptions include temporary restrictions on 
 
 110. General Agreement on Trade in Services, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
 111. See id. (explaining the rights and obligations of members along with dispute resolution 
in detail); see also WTO, Legal Texts – A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, 
http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#mAgreement (last visited Apr. 31, 
2008) (describing the obligations set out by the agreement). 
 112. GATS, supra note 110, art. I.2. Those modes of economic activity are 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of 
any other Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a 
Member in the territory of any other Member. 
Id. 
 113. Id. pts. II, III (defining the general and specific obligations of Members).  
 114. Id. arts. II–XV. 
 115. Id. arts. XVI, XVII. 
 116. WTO, Main Building Blocks: Agreement, Annexes, and Schedules, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c2s5p1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 
2008). 
 117. WTO, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES: AN INTRODUCTION 10 
(2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gsintr_e.doc. 
 118. GATS, supra note 110, arts. XII–XIV bis. 
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trade in services to safeguard balance of payments; measures to 
protect public morals or maintain public order; measures to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; and measures to enforce 
compliance with laws or regulations not inconsistent with the whole 
agreement, including avoidance of fraud.119 The GATS also allows 
measures intended to protect military or essential security interests.120 
These measures, however, must meet specific criteria laid out in the 
GATS so that nations do not misuse the exceptions to avoid treaty 
obligations.121 
In the event that a member nation chooses to violate the GATS, 
other member nations may challenge the action of the offending 
nation.122 At the request of the parties, the WTO Dispute Resolution 
Body (DRB) may establish an arbitration panel (panel) to examine 
the allegations.123 The panel considers the challenge and issues a 
report. Any party to the dispute then may seek further review of the 
arbitration decision by the DRB Appellate Body (Appellate Body)124 
made up of judges from various member nations.125 The offending 
nation, if found in violation, is expected to immediately correct the 
violation.126 A failure to correct the violation within a reasonable time 
may result in limited trade sanctions against the violator on behalf of 
the offended country.127 
1. Compatibility of the Chinese M&A Rules with the GATS.  In 
analyzing whether Article Twelve of the Chinese M&A Rules 
violates the GATS, this Note uses the approach followed by the 
 
 119. Id. arts. XII–XIV. 
 120. Id. art. XIV bis. 
 121. See id. art. XIV (setting out these measures). 
 122. WTO, How the GATS is Administered, http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/serv_e/ 
cbt_course_e/c4s4p1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2008); see also GATS, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. I, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (“The rules and procedures 
of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes between 
Members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of [GATS] . . . .”). 
 123. GATS, supra note 122, arts. VI–VII. 
 124. WTO, supra note 122; see also GATS, supra note 122, art. XVII (describing the 
Appellate Body and its procedures).  
 125. See WTO, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2008) (describing the composition of the 
Appellate Body that reviews WTO arbitration decisions interpreting the GATS). 
 126. WTO, supra note 122. 
 127. Id. 
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Appellate Body in United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (U.S.-Gambling),128 
which resolved a dispute between the United States and Antigua over 
U.S. measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and 
betting services.129 According to that standard, China has violated the 
GATS if (1) the GATS governs acquisitions of domestic companies 
by foreign-owned enterprises,130 (2) China has undertaken specific 
commitments as to acquisitions,131 (3) the revised Chinese M&A 
Rules have violated articles of the GATS,132 and (4) no defenses apply 
to the violations.133 
First, the GATS applies to investment of capital in domestic 
enterprises. Of the four modes of economic activity that the GATS 
governs, mode three is a commercial presence in the territory of 
another member country.134 A commercial presence includes “the 
constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person” in a 
member nation.135 Because a juridical person includes a commercial 
entity,136 acquisition of a company creates a commercial presence in 
the member country.137 Therefore, acquisitions meet the definition of 
mode three activity, commercial presence, and so the GATS applies 
to foreign acquisitions of Chinese enterprises.138 
 
 128. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 138–43, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-
Gambling Appellate Body Report]; see also Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting 
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 3.28–.29, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 
2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling Panel Report]. 
 129. See U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 66 (articulating a four-
part standard for identifying violations of the GATS); see also Panel Report, Mexico—Measures 
Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico Panel 
Report] (exhibiting the method for determining a WTO violation). 
 130. U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, § VI(A)(2). 
 131. Id. § VI(B). 
 132. Id. § VI(C). 
 133. Id.§ VI(H). 
 134. GATS, supra note 110, art. I(2)(c). 
 135. Id. art. XXVIII(d)(i). 
 136. See GATS, supra note 110, art. XXVIII(l) (defining a “juridical person” as “any legal 
entity duly constituted or otherwise organized under applicable law, whether for profit or 
otherwise, and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, 
trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or association”). 
 137. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 1. 
 138. GATS, supra note 110, art. XXVIII(d)(i). 
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Second, China has undertaken specific commitments under the 
GATS for mode three economic activity. The Chinese schedule of 
commitments adopts few restrictions for mode three activity, only 
limiting minimum investment percentages for foreign joint ventures,139 
establishment of branches and representative offices,140 and land use 
and ownership.141 The schedule further stipulates: “The conditions of 
ownership, operation and scope of activities, as set out in the 
respective contractual or shareholder agreement or in a license 
establishing or authorizing the operation or supply of services by an 
existing foreign service supplier, will not be made more restrictive 
than they exist as of the date of the China’s accession to the WTO.”142 
There are no limitations on market access across all industries; the 
schedule lists further restrictions, where they exist, on an industry-
specific basis.143 Although for some industries the schedule lists 
specific restrictions on investment or the creation of wholly foreign-
owned enterprises or majority foreign ownership, most are scheduled 
for removal within two to five years of China’s accession to the 
WTO.144 China was accepted into the WTO in 2001.145 Therefore, 
many of the limitations listed under the original Chinese schedule 
 
 139. People’s Republic of China – Schedule of Specific Commitments, Nov. 10, 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2 (“The proportion of foreign investment in an equity joint venture shall be 
no less than 25 per cent of the registered capital of the joint venture.”). 
 140. Id. The schedule states that 
[t]he establishment of branches by foreign enterprises is unbound, unless otherwise 
indicated in specific sub-sectors, as the laws and regulations on branches of foreign 
enterprises are under formulation. 
 . . . Representative offices of foreign enterprises are permitted to be established in 
China, but they shall not engage in any profit-making activities except for the 
representative offices under CPC 861, 862, 863, 865 in the sectoral specific 
commitments. 
Id. 
 141. Id. (“The land in the People’s Republic of China is State-owned. Use of land by 
enterprises and individuals is subject to . . . maximum term limitations [specified in the 
schedule].”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Therefore, an initial inquiry would be whether the new Chinese M&A Rules are 
more restrictive than rules or customs in existence in 2001, when the China joined the WTO. See 
infra note 145 and accompanying text. This question may not be controlling, however, because 
there is nothing in the schedule of commitments that exempts China from following GATS rules 
that would require China to be less restrictive in its approach to foreign acquisitions of domestic 
enterprises than the 2001 rules. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 144. See generally id. (showing that most of the exceptions expire within a two to five year 
period). 
 145. WTO, China – Member Information, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/countries 
_e/china_e.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2008). 
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have expired.146 China has then made specific commitments under the 
GATS for some sectors, listing no limitations on market access or 
national treatment. 
a. Violations.  Third, to have violated the GATS, China must 
have committed a specific violation of its commitments as defined by 
the articles of the trade treaty.147 Here, member nations to the GATS 
could challenge China’s regulations as a violation of the commitment 
to either market access or national treatment. 
The market-access commitment requires that “[w]ith respect to 
market access through the [four] modes of supply, each Member shall 
accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment 
no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations 
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”148 To violate this 
market-access commitment, a member nation must first have 
undertaken a specific commitment to provide market access in the 
relevant area of service.149 China has accepted specific commitments 
as to some sectors without market-access limitations.150 When a 
member nation has assumed “a market-access commitment in 
relation to the supply of a service through [the commercial presence 
mode of supply]” it has committed to “allow[ing] related transfers of 
capital into its territory.”151 Second, the GATS provides that in all 
sectors in which there is a market-access commitment, a member state 
may not adopt measures that place “limitations on the participation 
of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign 
shareholding.”152 
 
 146. By providing that many limitations would expire once China joined the WTO, the 
Chinese schedule of commitments further indicates an intention to gradually open almost all 
domestic markets to international competition. 
 147. See U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 215 (looking at the 
consistency of the measures and then their consistency with the GATS).  
 148. GATS, supra note 110, art. XVI(1) (footnote omitted). 
 149. U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 215. 
 150. See People’s Republic of China – Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 139 
(“The conditions of ownership, operation and scope of activities, as set out in the respective 
contractual or shareholder agreement or in a license establishing or authorizing the operation or 
supply of services by an existing foreign service supplier, will not be made more restrictive than 
they exist as of the date of China’s accession to the WTO.” (emphasis added)); supra notes 139–
46 and accompanying text. 
 151. GATS, supra note 110, art XVI(1) n.8. 
 152. Id. art. XVI(2)(f). 
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China is likely violating its market-access commitment by not 
allowing the free flow of foreign capital necessary to supply services 
through commercial presence. The Chinese rules, although not 
prohibiting the transfers of foreign capital altogether, restrict the flow 
of foreign capital into specific companies and other service 
providers.153 For example, in thwarting the Carlyle Group’s 
investment in Xugong, China obstructed the Carlyle Group’s ability 
to provide services to the Chinese domestic market.154 It kept the 
Carlyle Group from establishing a commercial presence in the 
building sector through Xugong.155 More broadly, by limiting the 
ability of foreign corporations to acquire domestic corporations, 
China has limited the ability of foreign corporations to provide 
services in the domestic market. If all foreign companies must create 
their own enterprises from scratch, they will stand at a distinct 
disadvantage relative to their domestic Chinese counterparts who 
enjoy already-constructed systems, supply chains, and enterprises. 
Therefore, China is likely violating the market-access commitment by 
limiting the foreign capital flow into domestic enterprises. 
In addition, China has arguably placed a maximum percentage 
limit on foreign shareholding in violation of its market-access 
commitment by requiring potentially every foreign acquisition to 
have Ministry of Commerce approval.156 Even if a country has not 
established an actual percentage for the limitation, it still may have a 
quota.157 Antigua raised this argument in U.S.-Gambling.158 It 
contended that the complete prohibition of gambling in the United 
States resulted in a quota of zero percent.159 Similarly, China’s 
arbitrary approval mechanism160 arguably creates a de facto quota that 
 
 153. See, e.g., id. art. 4 (stating in part that “[a]n acquisition shall not result in a foreign 
investor owning all of the equity interests” of certain specified industries). 
 154. Cf. Mexico Panel Report, supra note 129 (finding that Mexico was blocking the US 
access to the Mexico telecommunications market by not guaranteeing access on a cost based 
basis). 
 155. Cf. Largest Machine Tool Manufacturer to Sell Shares, supra note 63 (discussing how 
the Carlyle Group’s bid to takeover Xugong was rejected for fear of foreign control). 
 156. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, arts. 10–12. 
 157. See U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 238 (“[L]imitations 
amounting to a zero quota are quantitative limitations.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, arts. 10–12 (not specifying the criteria 
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China can change as conditions in its economy or the global economy 
change. Therefore, nations could challenge the Chinese M&A Rules 
for creating an illegal maximum-percentage limit on foreign 
shareholding and therefore violating China’s market-access 
commitments. 
Alternatively, nations might challenge the revised rules as a 
violation of China’s commitment to the GATS national treatment 
provision,161 which states that a member nation may not formally or 
informally treat services or service suppliers from another member 
nation less favorably than it treats domestic enterprises.162 As with the 
market-access provision, China has made specific commitments as to 
national treatment for many industries.163 Less favorable treatment is 
treatment that “modifies the conditions of competition in favor of 
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services 
or service suppliers of any other Member.”164 This standard does not 
impose any new duties on the member country; it simply implies that 
when a member country has made a commitment to allow foreign 
member companies to operate in a market, the foreign companies 
must be able to do so on equal footing with their domestic 
competitors. 
The Chinese rules likely violate the national treatment provisions 
of the GATS because they are facially discriminatory against foreign 
investors165 and therefore place the foreign investors at a disadvantage 
when competing against domestic investors to acquire a domestic 
 
that will be used to determine whether an acquisition is a threat to national economic security or 
the procedure by which such an evaluation will be made). 
 161. GATS, supra note 110, art. XVII. 
 162. Id. art. XVII(1). 
 163. People’s Republic of China – Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 139. 
 164. Id. GATS, supra note 110, art. XVII(3). The only exception listed in China’s schedule 
of commitments as to national treatment is a stipulation that China is “unbound for all the 
existing subsidies to domestic services suppliers in the sectors of audio-visual, aviation and 
medical services.” People’s Republic of China – Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 
139. Thus, the schedule leaves all other industries in which commitments have been undertaken 
unprotected. Further, for most of the industry specific commitments, China maintains no 
restrictions under national treatment for commercial presence. See id. (mandating that national 
treatment is “[u]nbound for all the existing subsidies to domestic services suppliers in the sectors 
of audiovisual, aviation and medical services”). So for most of the categories, China has not 
reserved the right to treat domestic and foreign entities differently as to services which China 
has committed to allow foreign entities to provide, including investment. Id. 
 165. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, art. 12 (stating that the rules only apply where it is an acquisition by a 
foreign party by a domestic corporation). 
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corporation. First, the rules are facially discriminatory to foreign 
investors of member and nonmember states because they apply only 
to acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign entities.166 Second, 
Article Twelve of the Chinese M&A Rules specifically states that 
certain corporations may not be acquired by foreign entities at all.167 
These two rules show that foreign competitors for the takeover of 
domestic companies would be at a distinct disadvantage relative to 
domestic competitors wishing to take over the same companies. 
Because the regulations place the foreign competitor at a 
disadvantage in sectors in which there are no national-treatment 
limitations as to commercial presence, China has likely violated its 
national-treatment commitments.168 
b. Exceptions.  Even if China has violated its treaty obligations, 
the GATS provides for narrow exemptions for treaty violations.169 
The exceptions are limited to extreme circumstances and are not 
meant to be a means of avoiding treaty commitments.170 To determine 
whether a specific measure is justified by one of the enumerated 
exceptions, panels follow a two-tier analysis.171 First, the panel 
determines whether the challenged measure addresses the particular 
issue specified by that exception.172 Second, if the measure does have 
the required “degree of connection” with the interest specified in the 
exception,173 the panel then resolves whether the measure is consistent 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. art. 4 (stating that there are certain industries where foreign investors may not 
acquire a stake).  
 168. GATS, supra note 110, art. XVII. 
 169. See id. art. XIV (stating that behavior that would otherwise violate the GATS will be 
exempt under the prescribed circumstances). 
 170. See id. (granting exceptions only if the member nation’s actions were necessary to 
protect important interests including public safety and order, human life or health, data privacy, 
and enforcement of contracts). 
 171. See U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶¶ 291–372 (addressing 
exceptions regarding the gambling issue). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. “The required nexus—or ‘degree of connection’—between the measure and the 
interest is specified in the language of the paragraphs themselves, through the use of terms such 
as . . . ‘necessary to.’” Id. ¶ 292. The panel then determines whether the measures are designed 
to protect the specified interest, and, if they are, whether the measures are necessary. Id. ¶ 294. 
This Note does not examine whether the Chinese M&A Rules are necessary because the Note 
determines that the Chinese M&A Rules are not designed to protect any of the interests 
specified in the GATS exceptions. See infra notes 175–98 and accompanying text.  
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with the chapeau of the Article delineating the claimed exception.174 
China could assert that its M&A Rules fit into two of the listed 
exceptions: the public morals and public order exception and the 
national security exception.175 It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese 
violation would fit into either exception. 
First, the Chinese M&A Rules likely are not narrowly tailored 
enough to fit into the public order and public morals exception of the 
GATS, which permits nations to take action “necessary to protect 
public morals or maintain public order.”176 The public order and 
public morals exception “may be invoked only where a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests 
of society.”177 The U.S.-Gambling decision broadly defined the public-
morals exception as “standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”178 In that case, 
the Appellate Body upheld the arbitration panel’s decision that laws 
enacted by the United States to combat internet gambling were 
intended and designed to protect the public morals and maintain 
public order by targeting certain undesirable social side effects of 
online gambling, including underage gambling.179 The laws at issue in 
U.S.-Gambling, however, were tailored to target a specific activity in 
a specific industry.180 
The Chinese M&A Rules are not limited to a specific activity but 
instead encompass a broad range of activities, services and 
industries.181 The rules’ asserted purpose of “safeguard[ing] . . . the 
economic security of the State”182 could be intended to convey a 
message of preserving public morals and public order by preventing 
any shocks to the economic system. Economic security does not 
appeal to specific standards of right or wrong, however. In addition, 
there is no evidence that China intended its restrictions on the 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; GATS, supra note 110, arts. XIV(a), XIV bis. 
 176. GATS, supra note 110, art XIV(a). 
 177. Id. art. XIV n.5. 
 178. U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 129, ¶ 296 (citation omitted).  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. ¶ 332 (“[T]he statutes prohibit the remote supply of gambling and betting 
services.”). 
 181. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, arts. 10–12 (stating that Ministry of Commerce authority extends across any 
industry that meets the criteria set out in Articles X–XII). 
 182. Id. art. 1. 
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purchase of domestic enterprises by foreign investors to address a 
particular or even general social concern other than market stability, 
a concern addressed in other exceptions to the GATS such as those 
for measures to maintain the balance of payments.183 Instead, from the 
language of the rules and the social context of their development, it is 
likely that China intended them to be market protection tools.184 
Therefore, because of the rules’ broad nature and their failure to 
address a specific moral or public danger, the Chinese M&A Rules 
likely do not fit the public morals and public order exception of the 
GATS.185 
Even if a panel found that the Chinese M&A Rules fell within 
the public morals and public order exception of the GATS, however, 
the panel would likely conclude that the rules were nevertheless 
noncompliant with the chapeau of Article XIV. According to the 
Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling, the focus of the chapeau is on 
whether a measure is being applied in a manner that “does not 
necessarily constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a 
disguised restriction on trade in services.”186 In U.S.-Gambling, the 
Appellate Body ruled that the U.S. restrictions on online betting and 
gambling were inconsistent with the chapeau and therefore not 
exempted by the public order and public morals exception. The 
Appellate Body based its conclusion on the U.S. failure to show that 
 
 183. GATS, supra note 110, art. XII. 
 184. The Chinese government–controlled newspaper Xinhua gives market stability as the 
reason for the revised rules. See Sustainable Investment and Not Speculation, supra note 107 
(“The [Chinese] laws are designed to help China maintain market order and balance national 
economic security and fair competition. The amendments ensure the protection of indigenous 
industries but also continue to encourage the investment enthusiasm of foreign companies.”). 
 185. It would also be unlikely that the measure would pass the “necessity” test as applied in 
US-Gambling. In that decision, the Appellate Body stated that the standard of necessity is an 
objective standard. U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 304. A WTO 
panel must “objectively assess the ‘necessity’ of the measure” based on all the evidence in the 
record. Id. This analysis should include a “determination of whether a WTO-consistent 
alternative measure which the Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is 
available for whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available.’” Id. ¶ 305. A 
“merely theoretical” alternative, however, may not be considered to be reasonably available. Id. 
¶ 308. In US-Gambling, the Appellate Body found that the gambling restrictions were necessary 
because there was only a theoretical alternative to the restrictions, bilateral discussions between 
the United States and Antigua. Id. ¶ 317. In the case of the Chinese M&A Rules, WTO-
compatible ways likely exist to address any concerns rather than restricting the purchase of 
domestic corporations by foreign investors. For example, the law could be tailored more 
narrowly to only disallow those mergers which would endanger public morality or public order 
as defined by the GATS. 
 186. U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 128, ¶ 35 (citation omitted). 
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the rules applied to both domestic and foreign services equally.187 The 
Chinese M&A Rules facially apply only to foreign entities and not to 
their domestic competitors.188 Thus, like the U.S. gambling rules, the 
Chinese M&A Rules on foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises 
likely do not comply with the chapeau of Article XIV and therefore 
do not qualify for the public morals and public order exception of the 
GATS. 
The second GATS exception available to China is the security 
exception, which allows members to take “action . . . necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests.”189 The GATS limits this 
exception to a list of three permissible actions.190 The Chinese M&A 
Rules, however, do not qualify under any of these security exceptions. 
First, the rules are not limited to acquisitions of companies “relating 
to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of provisioning a military establishment.”191 The revised 
regulations could affect industries completely unrelated to the 
military,192 like the haute couture fashion industry. In fact, the rule 
protecting “famous trademarks or traditional Chinese brands” seems 
to contemplate industries with products of primarily civilian 
 
 187. Id. ¶ 369. 
 188. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 189. GATS, supra note 110, art. XIV(b) bis. The GATS security exception contains two 
other provisions that exempt a member nation from its rules if the nation withholds information 
essential to its security interests or acts pursuant to the United Nations Charter to maintain 
peace and security. Id. art. XIV(a) and (c) bis. Because neither of these provisions readily 
applies to international acquisitions, this Note does not address them. 
 190. The GATS permits member states to take “any action” necessary to protect “essential 
security interests” 
(i) relating to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of provisioning a military establishment; 
(ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they 
are derived; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations. 
Id. art. XIV(b) bis. 
 191. Id. art. XIV(b)(i) bis; Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 12. Although they are not limited to military 
establishments, the Chinese M&A Rules contains clauses that would include such 
establishments as some of the corporations that cannot be acquired by foreign entities. Id. 
(stating that those industries that could affect national economic security must be submitted to 
the Ministry of Commerce for approval). In those specific cases, the exception probably applies, 
and China may treat foreign companies differently than domestic companies. 
 192. See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, supra note 2, art. 1 (stating that the provisions were created for the purpose of 
regulating foreign investments in China); see also discussion supra Part I.C. 
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consumer use.193 Second, the Chinese M&A Rules and in particular 
Article Twelve are not limited to the dangerous materials exception, 
which is limited to action “relating to fissionable and fusionable 
materials.”194 Article Twelve does not mention either fissionable or 
fusionable materials.195 Finally, it would be a stretch to say that China 
adopted these rules in a time of war,196 as China was not officially at 
war with anyone and there was no declared emergency in 
international relations at the time it adopted the M&A Rules. Even if 
China’s protectionist measures are considered part of the aftermath 
of the Cold War, the GATS specifies that exceptions are only 
available during a time of war or major declared emergency in 
international relations.197 This presumes that the violating behavior 
would cease when the moment of crisis had passed. 
Therefore, the Chinese rules on the acquisition of domestic 
corporations by foreign entities likely violate the GATS and are not 
justified by any enumerated exception.198  
 
 193. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 194. GATS, supra note 110, art. XIV(b)(ii) bis; Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, supra note 2, art. 12. 
 195. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
supra note 2, art. 12. 
 196. See GATS, supra note 110, art. XIV(b)(iii) bis (granting an exception for national 
security concerns if actions are “taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Scholars have questioned whether nations may raise a facial challenge to enabling 
legislation before a WTO tribunal. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Essay, Reflections on US—
Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 216, 219 (2007) (noting that “the doctrine that only mandatory laws may be 
subject to an ‘as such’ challenge is a well-established doctrine in WTO jurisprudence” but 
arguing that the “Appellate Body has evolved in its jurisprudence from [this 
mandatory/discretionary] doctrine . . . to an approach . . . that eschews the 
mandatory/discretionary distinction altogether and permits an ‘as such’ review of all 
methodologies that are of general and prospective application”). Legislation that merely 
enables a government to take an action that would violate the GATS usually does not violate 
the GATS unless such action is taken. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.26–7.28, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). Therefore, when asserting that 
this legislation violates the GATS, this Note assumes that China has actually taken the action 
violating the GATS. On the other hand, the Chinese M&A Rules are written broadly, and only 
a very narrow application of the rules would comply with the GATS. See discussion supra 
II.A.1.a. A nation thus might properly raise a facial challenge to the rules, even though they are 
enabling legislation. 
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2. Compatibility of the U.S. M&A Rules with the GATS.  
Despite differences between the U.S. and Chinese rules, the U.S. 
rules also likely violate the market access and national treatment 
provisions of the GATS and are not justified by any of its exceptions. 
Like China, the United States has undertaken specific commitments 
as to commercial presence in many industries.199 The U.S. schedule of 
commitments to the GATS, with the exception of some land use and 
tax treatment provisions, does not list any limitation as to market 
access or national treatment that spans all industries.200 Therefore, any 
additional inquiries into limitations would be on an industry-specific 
basis.201 Because the U.S. rules on the acquisition of domestic 
enterprises by foreign entities span all industries,202 they implicate at 
least some industries for which there are no limitations. 
a. Violations.  First, the United States, like China, has likely 
violated its commitments to provide equal market access because the 
U.S. rules do not allow the free flow of foreign capital necessary to 
supply services through commercial presence, and this restriction 
arguably creates an illegal quota on the investment of foreign funds.203 
The U.S. rules do not halt the flow of foreign capital altogether.204 
Instead they put restrictions on the flow of capital205 which could 
 
 199. United States—Schedule of Specific Commitments, Apr. 15, 1994, GATS/SC/90, 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/1994_USSCHEDULEATWTO.pdf.  
 200. Id. at 1–14. 
 201. Id. at 15–76. 
 202. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000) (“The President or the President’s designee shall 
make an investigation, as described in subsection (a), in any instance in which an entity 
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger, 
acquisition, or takeover which could result in control of a person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the United States.”).  
 203. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 204. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (allowing the president to review those transactions 
“which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States”). 
 205. Id. The GATS allows for domestic regulation so long as it is “not more burdensome 
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.” GATS, supra note 110, art. VI.4.b. Here, 
the inquiry is not limited to the quality of the service. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a). (“The term 
‘covered transaction’ means any merger, acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any foreign 
person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States.”). In addition, the regulation is administered in a discriminatory manner, as it 
only applies to foreign firms, which would also make it an impermissible domestic regulation 
under GATS. See GATS, supra note 110, art. VI.1 (“In sectors where specific commitments are 
undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade 
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impede the ability of foreign entities to establish a commercial 
presence and provide services to the U.S. domestic market.206 The 
rules also may create an illegal quota because, by allowing each deal 
to be reviewed, the United States has established a de facto quota 
based on changing circumstances.207 Therefore, the U.S. rules likely 
violate the United States’ market-access commitments. 
Second, the U.S. rules likely also violate the national treatment 
provisions of the GATS because they place foreign service providers 
at a disadvantage relative to their domestic competitors by resting 
additional burdens on foreign service providers to achieve a 
commercial presence in the U.S. domestic market. The U.S. rules are 
facially discriminatory because they apply exclusively to foreign 
entities,208 treating domestic competitors more favorably.209 Therefore, 
the U.S. rules likely are also a violation of the national-treatment 
provisions of the GATS. 
b. Exceptions.  The enumerated exceptions in the GATS would 
probably not apply to the U.S. rules either. The U.S. rules, although 
narrower than their Chinese counterparts, are probably too broad to 
be exempt in their entirety by the security exception of the GATS.210 
Under the U.S. rules, in choosing whether to investigate a particular 
transaction, CFIUS must consider as a threshold question whether 
there exists “credible evidence that the foreign interest exercising 
 
in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 206. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 207. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170; Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981), reprinted in 19 
U.S.C. § 2171 app. at 480–82 (2000) (allowing the president or the committee to unilaterally 
initiate a review of a transaction); supra Part II.A.1.a.  
 208. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (stating that the transactions subject to review include 
“mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers . . . by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign 
control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States”). 
 209. See Rappeport, supra note 29 (“[F]oreign companies could soon face greater scrutiny in 
the interests of national security when investing in the United States.”). 
 210. See supra Part II.A.1.b. Given that the U.S. rules do not speak of any other motivation 
other than national security, it is unlikely that the United States would try to justify its actions 
under the public morals and public order exception. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (providing that 
the president “may make an investigation to determine the effects [of the transaction] on the 
national security of the United States”). The motivations of the rules are not necessarily without 
merit. It is entirely possible that the rules are necessary regardless of any violation of the GATS. 
This Note only analyzes the compatibility of the rules with the GATS for the purpose of 
exploring the Chinese view that the United States has been hypocritical in its free-trade stance. 
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control might take action that threatens national security.”211 This 
standard is broad enough to encompass acquisitions that are 
unrelated to the provisioning of military establishments or fissionable 
materials, and are not necessarily taken in a time of war.212 In 
addition, the Foreign Investment and Security Act of 2007213 
mandates a period of investigation that would arguably put any 
acquisition by a foreign investor at a disadvantage to their domestic 
competitors.214 
One could argue that because the United States is in an ongoing 
war on terror, any action taken for national security purposes is 
justified under the GATS. This interpretation would likely violate the 
spirit of the GATS, however, by allowing member nations to 
disregard their WTO commitments as long as they are at war with 
someone or something on some front. For example, the United States 
could halt all motor vehicle part imports from Mexico on the grounds 
that the United States is at “war” with drugs, and cars coming from 
Mexico have been used to transport drugs. This use of the word 
“war” would conflict with the goal of consistent and predictable 
behavior desired by the GATS.215 Therefore, the security exemption 
of the GATS likely does not justify the U.S. violation of the market-
access or national-security commitments of the GATS. 
Thus, despite significant differences, the U.S. and Chinese rules 
on the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors likely 
violate each country’s respective commitments under the GATS. 
The revised Chinese rules reflect a knowledge and perhaps 
resentment of the perceived hypocrisy of the United States and others 
who preach free trade and yet continue to perpetuate policies that 
violate their own free trade obligations.216 Whether or not this view of 
the United States and others as hypocritical is fair or justified, this 
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perception has had an effect on the development of Chinese law in 
the area of acquisitions. The next Section explores the possible costs 
of this perception and the Chinese and U.S. violations on the world 
economic community. 
B. Costs of Violating the GATS 
By violating the terms of the WTO GATS, China and the United 
States do more than simply undermine their international credibility; 
they undermine the benefits provided by the GATS system itself. The 
benefits of the GATS for China, the United States, and the world 
depend not just on one country’s acquiescence but on the willingness 
of all involved parties to consistently maintain their commitments 
even when a violation would better accomplish immediate national 
interests.217 Likewise, the consequences of one country’s violation are 
not limited to that country. They multiply exponentially throughout 
the organization, affecting everyone involved and perhaps ultimately 
affecting the efficiency of the world economy.218 
The GATS provides many benefits.219 The WTO lists ten benefits 
that it believes come from having a World Trade Organization:  
1.  The system helps promote peace  
2.  Disputes are handled constructively  
3.  Rules make life easier for all  
4.  Freer trade cuts the costs of living  
5.  It provides more choice of products and qualities  
6.  Trade raises income  
7.  Trade stimulates economic growth  
8.  The basic principles make life more efficient  
9.  Governments are shielded from lobbying  
10. The system encourages good government[.]220  
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As a part of the WTO, the GATS agreement likewise promotes 
these goals. In fact, it more directly promotes these goals than the 
WTO alone because the GATS encourages the cross-border flow not 
only of goods but also services, which constitute a much more 
intimate and personal exchange between nations.221 
More specifically, the GATS can potentially better the lives of 
consumers by increasing competition within a traditionally domestic 
service industry like telecommunications.222 Competition drives down 
prices and enhances efficiency within industries.223 In addition, it 
promotes the advancement of technology, thus improving the lives of 
the public at large.224 These benefits are likewise important financially. 
Competition for supplying goods may drive the price of the good to 
the consumer down.225 Competition to buy corporations is likely to 
drive the price of the corporation up, however, creating wealth for the 
ownership226 and therefore benefiting the society as a whole. 
When laws enabling actions that violate the GATS create 
barriers to trade in services, they undermine these benefits. Even 
limiting the analysis to the two acquisitions discussed in this Note, 
CNOOC and the Carlyle Group, over 1.3 billion U.S. dollars were 
forfeited in preference for security concerns. The creation of 
additional legal frameworks to support similar restrictions on 
acquisitions would likely only compound the problem and further 
undermine the benefits of the WTO and the GATS agreement. 
Additionally, China’s entry into the WTO has provided a 
multiplicity of benefits to other developing countries in the Pacific 
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Rim area.227 These benefits are in part due to the increased economic 
activity between surrounding developing countries and China as a 
result of decreased trade barriers.228 If the Chinese entry into the 
WTO had positive benefits for other countries, it stands to reason 
that China’s violation of the WTO rules, which undermines its core 
principles, may also have effects far beyond its borders. 
Finally, Congress estimates that U.S. trade agreements have 
added billions of dollars in benefits to the U.S. economy.229 These 
benefits go far beyond the U.S. national borders.230 Since World War 
II, the United States has promoted increasingly free global trade to 
maintain peace and avoid another world war.231 Many of the benefits 
of the WTO are likewise benefits of free trade generally.232 Therefore, 
undermining the principles of free trade by violating international 
agreements affects both benefits to the United States of free trade 
and benefits garnered by other countries from U.S. free trade 
policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite these economic costs, it is important to recognize that 
the rules created to deal with foreign acquisitions of domestic 
enterprises were motivated in many cases by serious national 
concerns. The United States worries about the prospect of important 
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pieces of its infrastructure being in the hands of foreign powers.233 
Likewise, China fears that indiscretions of foreign investors will 
devastate its economy.234 These concerns are real and cannot be 
simply dismissed as protectionist rhetoric. They resonate deeply with 
both the politics and populace of both countries.235 
The United States acted in what it perceived to be its best 
interests in blocking the CNOOC acquisition of Unocal.236 China then 
acted in its own interests in blocking the Carlyle Group takeover of 
Xugong and issuing revised regulations on foreign acquisitions of 
domestic enterprises237 that disappointed many with their vagaries and 
lack of commitment to free and open trade in services through 
developing a commercial presence in China.238 The Chinese 
perception that the United States’ denial of the CNOOC acquisition 
was unfair and hypocritical connected these two actions.239 The 
United States and others in turn criticized the Chinese denial of the 
Carlyle Group acquisition as indicative of the protectionist nature of 
the still highly regulated economy.240 Judging from the independent 
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standard of the GATS, both accusations were somewhat justified.241 
Both the United States and China are likely violating their treaty 
obligations and thereby incurring costs for themselves and possibly 
for the rest of the world.242 
This Note is not intended to condemn the policies or rules of 
either China or the United States concerning the acquisition of 
domestic enterprises by foreign entities. Rather, it shows that even 
perceptions of hypocrisy can have serious consequences. When 
choosing to act, even in the interests of national security, the United 
States should be careful to consider the detrimental effect its policies 
may have on other countries. 
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